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SEPARATION OF POWERS:
CONGRESSIONAL RIDERS AND THE VETO POWER
Conflicts between the executive and legislative branches of the
federal government are a common and perhaps inevitable feature
of the American constitutional system.' Although it is the proper
scope of their respective roles in the conduct of foreign affairs that
has recently occupied the center of attention, 2 other areas of
competition between presidential and congressional authority
have been the subject of increasing concern on the part of both
officials and commentators. 3 One problem which has received
somewhat less attention, but which involves a potentially serious
conflict between the branches, is the degree to which the widespread use by Congress of nongermane amendments to bills, or
President's power to veto legisriders, 4 may improperly limit the
5
lation of which he dk. kpproves.
1 The "rivalry for political supremacy between Congress and the President ... was built
4

into the Constitution." J. HARRIS, CONGRESSIONAL CONTROL OF ADMINISTRATION

(1964).
2 See, e.g., Lofgren, War-Making Under the Constitution: The Original Understanding,
81 YALE L.J. 672 (1972); Rostow, Great Cases Make Bad Law: The War Powers Act, 50
TEX. L. REV. 833 (1972); Wallace, War-Making Powers: A Constitutional Flaw?, 57
CORNELL L. REV. 719 (1972); Rogers, Congress, the President, and the War Powers, 59
CALIF. L. REV. 1194 (1971); Wallace, The President's Exclusive Foreign Affairs Powers
over Foreign Aid (pts. ]-2), 1970 DUKE LJ. 293, 453; Henkin, Constitutional Issues in
Foreign Policy, 23 INT'L. AFF. 222 (1969).
3The doctrine of executive privilege, invoked to justify the withholding of testimony or
written information from Congress, has provoked considerable controversy. See, e.g.,
Hearings on S. 1125 Before the Subcomm. on the Separation of Powers of the Senate
Comm. on the Judiciary, 92d Cong., 1st Sess. (1971); Berger, Executive Privilege v.
Congressional Inquiry, 12 U.C.L.A.L. REV. 1044 (1965); Younger, Congressional Investigations and Executive Secrecy: A Study in the Separation of Powers, 20 U. PITT. L.
REV. 755 (1959); Comment, Policing the Executive Privilege, 5 U. MICH. J.L. REF. 568
(1972).
The authority of the executive branch to impound funds appropriated by Congress has
been a subject of much debate. See, e.g., Church, Impoundment of Appropriated Funds:
The Decline of Congressional Control over Executive Discretion, 22 STAN. L. REV. 1240
(1970); Miller, Presidential Power to Impound Appropriated Funds: An Exercise in
Constitutional Decision-Making, 43 N.C.L. REV. 502 (1965); Goostree, The Power of the
President to Impound Appropriated Funds: With Special Emphasis to Grants-In-Aid to
Segregated Activities, I I AM. U.L. REV. 32 (1962).
Executive orders have also been subjected to critical scrutiny. See, e.g., Comment,
Executive Orders and the Development of Presidential Power, 17 VILL. L. REV. 688
(1972); Comment, Presidential Legislation by Executive Order, 37 U. COL. L. REV. 105
(1964).
* See part I A infra.
* U.S. CONST. art. I, § 7, cl. 2. See part I B infra.
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The recent efforts of some members of Congress to attach to
various pieces of legislation an "end-the-war" amendment, designed to restrict funding for continued American involvement in
Vietnam, underscore the immediacy of this problem. 6 If a nongermane amendment which the President strongly opposes were to
reach his desk attached to a bill which he feels is otherwise vital
to the nation's well-being, he would face a difficult choice. The
assumption to date has been that the President must either sign a
bill as it is presented to him or veto it in its entirety. 7 Under this
interpretation, the President would be forced to accept any
amendment which he opposes, along with the remainder of the
bill, or reject the main provisions of the legislation in order to
avoid enactment of the amendment. There are indications, however, that in such a case the President might refuse to follow the
traditional practice. 8 It is not inconceivable that he might attempt
to veto separately an amendment to which he is totally opposed in
an effort to salvage essential legislation, while asserting the further
purpose and justification of recapturing his constitutional prerogatives from longstanding congressional encroachment. 9
6 Several proposals fit under the general title of "end-the-war" amendments. The
McGovern-Hatfield amendment to the Military Procurement Bill of 1971 would have
allowed expenditures of funds in Vietnam after April 30, 1971, only for the orderly
withdrawal of American troops, in efforts to secure the release of prisoners of war, for
provisions of asylum for endangered Vietnamese, and for other purposes "consistent with
the foregoing objective" of total withdrawal. Amend. No. 862 to H.R. 17123, 91st Cong.,
2d Sess., 116 CONG. REC. 30,080 (1970). The Cooper-Church amendment to the Special
Foreign Assistance Act of 1971 prohibited the expenditure of funds for the reintroduction
of American troops into Cambodia. Act of Jan. 5, 1971, Pub. L. No. 91-652, § 7, 84 Stat.
1943, codified as 22 U.S.C. § 2411 note (1970). The Mansfield amendment to the Military
Procurement Authorization Act of 1972 merely requests the President to take "immediate
steps" to terminate United States involvement in Vietnam. Act of November 17, 1971,
Pub. L. 92-156, § 60 1(a), 85 Stat. 430. The McGovern-Hatfield amendment, unlike the
Cooper-Church and Mansfield amendments, was rejected by Congress. To the extent that
these-proposals attempted to end a particular activity of the armed forces, they were not
totally germane to the subject matter of the bills to which they were introduced as
amendments. The bills were, however, concerned generally with military appropriations.
7 Clineburg, The Presidential Veto Power, 18 S.C.L. REV. 732, 751 (1966).
8 A growing impatience with congressional riders may have been reflected by President
Nixon's statement upon signing the Military Procurement Authorization Act of 1972: "1
wish to emphasize that § 601 of this act-the so-called 'Mansfield amendment'-does not
represent the policies of this administration. . . . [It is without binding force or effect." 7
WEEKLY COMP. PRES. Docs. 1531 (Nov. 22, 1971). See also Item Veto Hearings Before a

Subcomm. of the House Comm. on the Judiciary, 85th Cong., Ist Sess., at 51 (1957)
(remarks of Representative S. Udall) [hereinafter cited as Item Veto Hearings].
9 See Givens, The Validity of a Separate Veto of Nongermane Riders to Legislation, 39
TEMPLE L.Q. 60 (1965). Of course, a second option open to the President would be to
sign the entire bill into law and simply refuse to comply with the objectionable rider. See
note 8 supra. If the current dispute over presidential impoundment of funds is resolved in
favor of the President, such a refusal would appear to be even more likely. See note 43
infra. Previous Presidents have, on occasion, successfully ignored restrictive legislation.
For example, a 1913 law (22 U.S.C. § 262 (1970)) providing that the President shall
attend no international conference without congressional authorization has been frequently
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It has been suggested that in order to avoid this potential crisis
statutory authority to veto nongermane riders be granted to the
President.1 0 One author has contended that no such statute is
needed, that the President presently has such power under Article
I, Section 7 of the Constitution.' On the other hand, bills have
been introduced in both houses of Congress which might have
specifically denied that power to the President.' 2 This article
examines whether there is any constitutional ground on which the
President could take the unprecedented action of separately
13
vetoing congressional riders.
I. HISTORICAL

BACKGROUND

A. The Legislative Rider
A rider, broadly defined, is any clause which is added to a bill
after the bill has emerged from committee. 1 4 The term may be
used somewhat more narrowly to refer only to clauses added to
appropriations bills.1 5 Finally, the word may embrace only
amendments which are not germane to the subject matter of the
original bill. 16 Although the term will be used herein specifically
with reference to the third definition, its practical character and
connotations overlap the other two. For instance, riders, as used
in the third sense, are most often attached to appropriations bills.
The enormous pressures upon the executive to approve essential
appropriations rather than imperil agencies or programs makes the
rider a potent weapon in any effort to gain presidential approval of
ignored. The President could, of course, argue that such restrictions on the conduct of
foreign affairs constitute an impermissible intrusion into his powers as Commander in
Chief. See U.S. CONST. art. I1, § 2, cl. 1. In any event, there may be tactical advantages in
using the veto rather than failing to follow the distasteful part of what is nevertheless a
facially valid law which he has himself approved in its entirety.
:0 See Clineburg, supra note 7, at 754.
1 Givens, supra note 9, at 62.
12 H.R. 6225, 92d Cong., 1st Sess. (1971); S. 1642, 92d Cong., 1st Sess. (1971). Section
302(b) of each bill provides that "The President shall not make any notation on a bill, so
presented, other than his signature and, if he desires, the word 'approved' and the date."
The Committee on Federal Legislation of the New York City Bar Association has
interpreted this section to preclude any exercise of a partial veto. See 167 N.Y.L.J. (Jan.
12, 1972) at 1,col. 5.
13 Largely outside the scope of this article are certain considerations relating to the
broader subject of item vetoes as applied to the clearly germane provisions of a bill; the
considerations peculiar to item vetoes of appropriations bills (see notes 15, 16, 134, and
135 and accompanying text infra); and the problems raised by administrative noncompliance with enacted legislation (see note 9 supra).
14 BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY

1486 (4th ed. rev. 1968).

15E.g., Commonwealth v. Barnett, 199 Pa. 161, 172, 48 A. 976, 977 (190 1).
16 B. GROSS, THE LEGISLATIVE STRUGGLE 221 (1953).
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legislation which, if passed separately, would surely be vetoed.' 7
Another factor producing definitional spillover is the difficulty
inherent in assessing what is or is not germane to a bill. For
example, a favorite type of floor amendment is the pork-barrel
public works project, designed primarily to benefit the sponsor's
constituency. 18 Although certainly relevant to the subject of appropriations, such amendments are sufficiently distinguishable
from the original purposes of the bill to be widely characterized as
riders. Under a very liberal interpretation almost any amendment
added to a bill after it leaves the committee could be considered
nongermane. Under this interpretation, the first and third definitions would be equated. 19 For these reasons, the use of the term
"rider" must remain somewhat inexact.
It is important to note that riders were not discussed 20 and
21
apparently not foreseen by the framers of the Constitution.
They did not appear in Congress until 182022 and did not become
common until after the Civil War. 23 Originally used by one house
of Congress to coerce the other house into accepting a provision
that otherwise would have been rejected, not until Reconstruction
did riders become instruments for the coercion of the President by
a hostile Congress. 24 Since that time they have been frequently
employed to circumvent the executive veto.
Not surprisingly, Presidents have been highly critical of the use
of riders. 25 Criticism has not been confined to the executive
branch, however. The Supreme Court has described the practice
of logrolling, by which riders are often attached to appropriations
17 W. KEEFE & M. OGUL, THE AMERICAN LEGISLATIVE PROCESS: CONGRESS AND THE
STATES 255 (2d ed. 1968).
"ISee Harris, supra note 1, at 53-55, 114.
19
See W. KEEFE & M. OGUL, supra note 17, at 255.
20

See generally J. ELLIOT, DEBATES (1836); THE RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787 (M. Farrand ed. 1937).
21 Zinn, The Veto Power of the President, 12 F.R.D. 207, 240 (1952).
22 In that year the bill admitting Missouri to statehood was attached to the bill admitting
Maine. E. MASON, THE VETO POWER 48 n.I (1890).

23 Id. n.4. According to one author there were 387 riders attached to appropriations bills
between 1862 and 1875. H. DAVIS, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONS 30 (1885).

24 E. MASON, supra note 22, at 48 n. 1. The value of the rider in the struggle between the
Congress and President Andrew Johnson insured its survival beyond the early years of
Reconstruction. By 1879, for example, the Democrats had gained control of Congress, and
they attached to an appropriations bill a rider which would have eliminated the practice of
using federal troops to guard ballot boxes in the South during elections. The amended bill
passed Congress five times, only to be met on each occasion by President Hayes' veto.

Finally, the Democrats conceded the issue and passed an unamended appropriations bill.
H. DAVIS, supra note 23, at 30-32.
2 7 J. RICHARDSON, MESSAGES AND PAPERS OF THE PRESIDENTS 242 (1898) (President
Grant's proposal to vest the President with a full item-veto power); id. at 531 (President
Hayes' message accompanying the veto of a bill with objectionable riders); 5 id. at 462

(President Buchanan's state of the union address, in which he objects to the limitations
placed on presidential review of legislation by the use of riders).
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bills, as "pernicious. " 2 6 Several states have constitutional provisions prohibiting nongermane amendments to legislation, 27 designed to eliminate those abusive devices which so often "embraced
ill digested and pernicious legislation, relief bills, private
appropriations measures, and the like." 28 Even in Congress, each
house has a rule prohibiting the introduction of nongermane
amendments, 2 9 and members have voiced their concern over the
0
use of riders.a
Despite the distinctly pejorative connotations attached to the
term "rider," the device remains a common feature of the nation's
legislative process. 3 1 The tenacity with which the practice of
attaching riders has resisted critics and reformers3 2 has not been
solely a function of legislators' desires to protect their special
interests, however. The practice of enacting legislation through
riders serves other, more respectable purposes. First, it can significantly expedite the legislative process. By introducing what
would be a separate bill as an amendment to one that has already
reached the floor for consideration, the lengthy and often obstructive committee process 3 3 is avoided. In view of Congress'
heavy workload, 3 4 the use of bills embracing a variety of measures may be an essential part of its procedure.3 5 Second, bills
26 Bengzon v. Secretary of Justice, 299 U.S. 410, 415 (1937). See also Commonwealth
v. 2Barnett,
199 Pa. 161, 172, 48 A. 976, 977 (1901).
7
E.g., PA. CONST. art. Ill, § 3; VA. CONST. art. IV, § 12; OHIO CONST. art. II, § 16;
Mo.
CONST. art. Il1, § 23;TEx. CONST. art. 111,
§ 35.
28
Exparte Hallawell, 155 Cal. 112, 114,99 P. 490, 491 (1909).
29 H.R. Res. 46, 44th Cong., IstSess., R. 16, No. 7 (1876); S. Res. 18, 48th Cong., 1st
Sess., R. 16 (1884).
30
James A. Garfield, while in Congress, described the use of riders as being "revolutionary to the core .... destructive of the fundamental element of American liberty, the
free consent of all the powers that unite to make laws." 9 CONG. REC. 117 (1879) (remarks
of Representative Garfield). During the same debate, one congressman described the
practice of attaching riders to appropriations bills as the action of "a merciless jailor" who
"place[s] before a famishing prisoner food mixed with poison and then say[s] to him: eat or
refuse; the responsibility of your life rests entirely with you." 9 CONG. REC. 560 (1879)
(remarks of Representative Burrows).
31 "The familiar interpretation of riders characterizes them as evasive, underhanded,
and, in degree, even dangerous; however that may be, Congress has given its tacit consent
to their use, a point readily verified in roll-call votes." W. KEEFE & M. OGUL,supra note
17, at 256.
32 Inasmuch as the congressional rules prohibiting nongermane amendments have not
prevented their continual use, the primary tactic of those opposed to the use of riders has
been an effort to attain congressional approval of a power to veto items of appropriations
bills. Since the first such proposal was introduced nearly one hundred years ago (H.R. 46,
44th Cong., Ist Sess. (1876) ), over 150 bills have been offered providing for such a power.
In spite of support from various Presidents and influential congressmen, only a few of
these have even reached the floor, and none have been voted upon. J. HARRIS, supra note
I, at 111.
33See generally W. KEEFE & M. OGUL, supra note 17, at 161-237; G. GALLOWAY,
THE LEGISLATIVE PROCESS IN CONGRESS 273-326 (1953).
34 It has been estimated that twenty thousand bills are introduced during both sessions
of Congress. W. KEEFE & M. OGUL, supra note 17, at 162.
3, Item Veto Hearings, supra note 8, at 51 (remarks of Representative S. Udall).
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with topically diverse provisions are often the result of complex
interaction between members of Congress. Making a measure
more acceptable by the attachment of riders favored by a small
group of legislators, or even by one influential member, is often
essential in securing its passage.3 6 Furthermore, bills that otherwise may never receive serious consideration if referred to a
hostile committee may be introduced as riders. By far the most

important function of riders, however, is the enhancement of
Congress' bargaining position vis- -vis the President, for the rider
necessarily circumvents to some degree the President's veto pow7
er. 3
B. The PresidentialVeto Power
Two types of presidential vetoes are clearly recognized by the
Federal Constitution.3 8 First, the President may return a bill with
which he disagrees to the house in which it originated. 39 Secondly,
if the President does not sign a bill within ten days after it is
presented to him but is prevented from returning the bill because
of congressional adjournment, the bill will not become law.40 In
the latter case, of course, there is no possibility that Congress
may override the veto. 4 1 A third category of the general power to
reject legislation is the item veto, which allows the executive to
reject specific sections of a bill while giving approval to the
remainder. Although state constitutions often grant some form of
H. WALKER, LAW MAKING IN THE UNITED STATES 346 (1934).
See notes 7-8 and accompanying test supra.
U.S. CONST. art. I, § 7, cl. 2 reads in part:
Every Bill which shall have passed the House of Representatives and the
Senate, shall, before it becomes a Law, be presented to the President of the
United States; If he approve he shall sign it, but if not he shall return it, with
his Objections to the House in which it shall have originated, who
shall ... proceed to reconsider it. If after such Reconsideration two thirds of
that House shall agree to pass the Bill, it shall be sent together with the
Objections, to the other House, by which it shall likewise be reconsidered,
and if approved by two thirds of that House, it shall become a Law.... If
any Bill shall not be returned by the President within ten Days... after it
shall have been presented to him, the Same shall be a Law, in like Manner as
if he had signed it, unless the Congress by their Adjournment prevent its
Return, in which Case it shall not be a law.
39 This type is sometimes referred to as a "return" veto. See Note, The Presidential
Veto Power:A Shallow Pocket,70 MICH. L. REV. 148, 149 (1971).
40
This device is commonly called the "pocket" veto. See generally Bellamy, The
Growing Potentialof the Pocket Veto: Another Area of Increasing PresidentialPower, 61
36
37
38

ILL. B.J. 85 (1972).

41 A related issue concerns the meaning of the term "adjournment" in Article 1, Section
7: whether that term refers to any congressional recess or only to sine die adjournment.
Under the former interpretation the President could pocket veto a bill during any recess.
See generally Note, supra note 39. Bills have been introduced in both houses of Congress
which would limit the term's meaning to sine die adjournment. H.R. 6225, 92d Cong., 1st
Sess. (197 1); S. 1642, 92d Cong., 1st Sess. (197 1).
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the item veto to the state's chief executive, 42 the Federal Constitution provides no similar power to the President. 43 The power
to veto nongermane riders might be regarded as a form of the item
veto, for it would allow the President to reject specific sections of
bills while giving approval to the remainder of the legislation.
Even the limited veto power enunciated in the Constitution was
44
not given to the President without much debate by the framers.
The experience of the colonial period was fresh on the minds of
the authors of the Constitution. The governors of all thirteen of
the original colonies had possessed an absolute veto power; furthermore, the King of England could prevent any bill from becoming law in all of the colonies except Maryland, Rhode Island, and
Connecticut. 45 The King did not hesitate to exercise this power,
and the resulting resentment was a major factor leading to the
Revolution. The first grievance cited in the Declaration of Independence was that the King "has refused his assent to laws
most wholesome and necessary to the public good." It is therefore
not surprising that the new nation, under the Articles of Confederation, had no executive branch whatsoever. In several of the
new states there was no governor, and in all the others except
46
Massachusetts the governor had no veto power.
Although some proposed that a council be established under
the Constitution to review legislative acts, 4 7 and others, including
Alexander Hamilton, favored vesting the President with an absolute veto,4 the constitutional convention finally settled on the
more limited "qualified" veto. 49 In light of the colonial experi42

See notes 133- 35 infra.
43The impoundment of appropriated funds (see note 3 supra) may be considered a form
of the item veto, for the President may, through impoundment, refuse to spend funds
appropriated by one section of an appropriations bill while giving full effect to the
remainder of the legislation by authorizing expenditures in accordance with congressional
desires. There has been an increasingly vigorous challenge mounted against the practice of
impoundment, both in Congress and in the courts. See Impoundment of Funds: Constitutional Crisis Ahead, 31 CONG. Q., 213 (1973). A federal district court has recently
ruled that the withholding of highway funds by the Secretary of Transportation, under the
terms of the Federal-Aid Highway Act specifically barring impoundment, was unlawful.
State Highway Comm'n v. Volpe, 347 F. Supp. 951 (W.D. Mo. 1972), affd, 41 U.S. L.W.
2539 (8th Cir. April 2, 1973). A decision in favor of the President's power to impound
funds would lend support to the validity of the corresponding item veto analyzed herein.
Likewise, a decision against the President on the impoundment issue may be based on the
absence of any item veto power under the Constitution. Cf. Church, supra note 3, at 1249.
Such
a decision would seem to invalidate an attempt to veto nongermane riders.
44
See generally E. MASON, supra note 22, at 17-23.
4Id.at 17.
46 In Massachusetts the governor's veto could be overridden by the legislature. Id. at
18-19.
47 4 J. ELLIOT, supra note 20, at 622.
48 Id. at 623.

49Alexander Hamilton, fearing the popular reaction to any mention of the term "veto,"
used the phrase "qualified negative" to describe the President's power under the new
Constitution. See THE FEDERALIST No. 49, at 514-15 (J. Hamilton ed. 1864) (A. Hamilton). Similarly, the word "veto" does not appear in the Constitution.

742

Journal of Law Reform

[VOL. 6:735

ence, it is perhaps remarkable that the executive was given any
veto power at all. 50
Since the constitutional convention, many proposals have
been made for the reform of the veto provision of the Constitution. In 1818 a resolution was introduced in Congress calling
for the abolition of the veto power.5 1 One objection to the veto
was that it was highly undemocratic, for the objections of one man
could stand in the way of the will of a majority of the people's
representatives. Furthermore, since a presidential veto was rarely
overridden, the veto power was viewed as being, for all practical
purposes, absolute, and thus contrary to the intentions of the
framers. 52 On the other hand, many proposals have been made for
expanding the veto power. The most frequent suggestion is the
institution of the power to veto items of appropriations bills separately 53 President Grant went even further, asking for the power
54
to veto sections of any bill.

Several purposes have been ascribed to the presidential veto
power. Its general purpose, of course, is to serve as a check on
unwise policy trends in legislation. 55 More specifically, some have
argued that it provides for a review of legislation by one representing a national, as opposed to a local or regional, interest 5 6
Others argue that it serves to provide a check on potential legislative encroachment on executive power. 57 The unrestricted use by
Congress of nongermane amendments, by inhibiting the President's use of his veto power, could surely thwart all three objectives.
Thus the enactment of riders by Congress, although serving
several purposes within the legislative process, may constitute an
unreasonable encroachment on the presidential power, provided
in Article I, Section 7, to oversee legislative policy. Under the
traditional notion that the President has no item veto power, the
use of riders significantly limits the exercise of the power to veto
objectionable legislation.
5

°Comment, Federal Legislation: The Item Veto in the American Constitutional System, 25 GEO. L.J. 106, 109 (1936).
51

52

E.

MASON,

supra note 22, at 136.

Id. at 135.
53 See note 32 supra; Item Veto Hearings, supra note 8, at 5, 8 (remarks of Representative Keating).
54 7 J. RICHARDSON, supra note 25, at 242.
55 E. MASON, supra note 22, at 132-33. In the early years of the nation it was widely
believed that the President could exercise the veto power only if his objection to the
legislation were based on an alleged constitutional defect in the bill. Zinn, supra note 2 1, at
230. In recent years, of course, vetoes on grounds of policy have become universally
accepted.
56 Item Veto Hearings, supra note 8, at 50-51 (remarks of Representative S. Udall).
57 Clineburg, supra note 7, at 737.
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I1.

CONSTITUTIONAL INTERPRETATION

It is possible that the constitutional language itself 58 may hold
the solution to the conflict between riders and the veto power. As
used in that provision, the word "bill" may be held to refer only to
a discrete, topically differentiated piece of legislation. One which
had been adulterated by the addition of a nongermane amendment
would, under this interpretation, be the constitutional equivalent
of two separate bills. 59 The President would then be free to act
upon them individually, vetoing one (the rider), while approving
the other (the original bill). If such a definition of "bill" is inherent
in the language of Article I, Section 7, then no statutory authorization is needed to enable the President to veto nongermane
riders.
There are several arguments in favor of such a construction.
Because the rules of both houses of Congress prohibit nongermane amendments, 6 0 it has been argued that Congress has defined
the word "bill" to mean a piece of legislation dealing with related
subjects. 6 1 The difficulty with this approach, however, is that the
rules do not provide that a bill loses its quality as a single bill
when a nongermane provision is added; they merely provide that
such amendments should not be introduced. Even if the rules did
contain a limited definition of the word "bill," they would not
dispose of the issue of that term's constitutional meaning, for a
procedural rule of Congress cannot alter the meaning of constitutional language. 62 If the constitutional definition of a bill embraces legislation with topically diverse provisions, no
self-imposed rule of Congress could limit that meaning.
An attempt has also been made to find a congressional definition in that body's "general practice" of separating proposals into
"bills" according to their dominant subject. 63 Actual congressional practice does not seem to support this argument. In fact, to the
extent that legislative custom furnishes any guidance in this matter, the practices of ignoring rules prohibiting nongermane
amendments 64 and frequently presenting omnibus legislation to
the President 65 indicates a broader definition. Even if the use of
58 See note 38 supra.
See Givens, supra note 9, at 60; Zinn, supra note 21, at 240.
60 See note 29 supra.
61 Givens, supra note 9, at 63; Clineburg, supra note 7, at 753.
62 "The Constitution empowers each house to determine its rules of proceedings. It may
not by its rules ignore constitutional restraints ....
United States v. Bailin, 144 U.S. 1, 5
(1891).
0 Givens, supra note 9, at 63.
"See note 31 and accompanying text supra.
6 Item Veto Hearings, supra note 8, at 51 (remarks of Representative S. Udall).
59

744
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riders were merely an aberration in the normal legislative process,
the definitional issue must remain open. As was the case with
be considered deprocedural rules, congressional practice cannot
66
interpretation.
terminative of constitutional
Longstanding practice and belief are not, however, without
importance in construing constitutional language. Particularly in
uncertain areas, such as the relations between the three branches
of government, acquiescence by one branch in a particular practice of another branch will lend support to the constitutionality of
that practice. 67 The continual acquiescence by Presidents in the
congressional use of nongermane amendments may thus indicate
the constitutional validity of a broad interpretation of the word
"bill." 68 The relative frequency with which traditional assumptions are overthrown in the constitutional arena 69 nevertheless
dictates caution in drawing inferences from patterns of acquiescence. Perhaps the most that can be said of the veto power in this
context is that there exists a presumption, founded upon long70
standing custom, against a narrow definition of the word "bill."
More support for a limited definition of the word "bill" is
derived from the observation of Justice Stone that the Con71
stitution is "concerned with substance and not with form."
66 In Edwards v. United States, 286 U.S. 482, 485, 487-90 (1932), the Supreme Court
held that under Article I, Section 7 of the Constitution, the President could sign a bill after
the adjournment of Congress despite "opposing views strongly held in the past" and a
history of presidential avoidance of post-adjournment signings.
67 "Long settled and established practice is a consideration of great weight in a proper
interpretation of constitutional provisions of this character." The Pocket Veto Case, 279
U.S. 655, 689 (1929). See also Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579,
61368 (1952); Meyers v. United States, 272 U.S. 52, 119, 136 (1926).
The Pocket Veto Case, 279 U.S. 655, 688- 89 (1929). The Court stated:
The views which we have expressed as to the construction and effect of the
constitutional provision here in question are confirmed by the practical construction that has been given to it by the Presidents through a long course of
years, in which Congress has acquiesced.
69
See, e.g., Fuentes v. Shevin, 407 U.S. 67 (1972) (replevin laws authorizing prehearing
seizure of goods violate due process clause of fourteenth amendment); Furman v. Georgia,
408 U.S. 238 (1972) (death penalty as presently administered constitutes cruel and
unusual punishment). Between 1810 and 1956 the Supreme Court overruled at least ninety
of its prior decisions, of which fully two-thirds were in the area of constitutional law.
Blaustein & Field, "Overruling" Opinions in the Supreme Court, 57 MICH. L. REV. 151,
16770(1958).
See The Pocket Veto Case, 279 U.S. 655, 690 (1929), quoting with approval from
State ex rel. Corbett v. South Norwalk, 77 Conn. 257,264, 58 A. 759, 761 (1904):
[A] practice of at least twenty years duration "on the part of the executive
department, acquiesced in by the legislative department, while not absolutely
binding on the judicial department, is entitled to great regard in determining
the true construction of a constitutional provision the phraseology of which is
in any respect of doubtful meaning."
Most who have argued that the President should have the power to veto nongermane
amendments separately have conceded that special legislation would be necessary to
confer such a power. See Zinn, supra note 21, at 241; Clineburg, supra note 7, at 754.
71 Dimick v. Scheidt, 293 U.S. 474, 490 (1935) (Stone, J., dissenting).
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Under this view, the meaning of the word is to be derived from a
consideration of what substantively comprises a bill, not what is
formally called such by Congress. The label which Congress
attaches to a piece of legislation should not be allowed to foreclose consideration of its true character, which would be determined by its range of subject matter. 72 The proponents of this
view, however, have failed to provide criteria of germaneness
adequate to implement the definition which they propose. The
problems raised by attempting to define a rider by its topical
germaneness 73 are likewise encountered in defining a bill as "a
legislative instrument setting forth one or more propositions of
law all related to a single subject matter." 74 Neither the language
of the Constitution, nor its history, nor its logic furnishes any
assistance in setting a standard of relevance. Were the
single-subject test explicitly authorized in the Constitution, the
specifics could probably be developed through the gradual accretion of practical and litigational precedents. That the formula itself
is an extrapolation from inconclusive language and contrary practice may well combine with its initial pliability to create too great
a factor of uncertainty.
A final argument in favor of a limited definition of the word
"bill" is the proposition that this meaning was intended by the
framers of the Constitution. 75 There were no debates over the
meaning of the word at the constitutional convention, 76 and no
other contemporaneous recognition that its interpretation would
present any difficulties has been found. This silence may be related to the fact that nongermane amendments were alien to the
legislative process in the early years of the nation. 77 One possible

inference is that the founding fathers were familiar only with
topically separated legislative acts and that they assumed without
question that the word "bill" would refer to such acts. The framers' silence is equally consistent, however, with other, contradictory interpretations. They may have been primarily concerned with the phenomenon of congressional action upon a proposal, in which case "bill" was intended as merely a procedural
term, used to refer to anything which Congress wishes to pass
under a single title. Whatever may have been the framers unarticulated and perhaps unexamined assumptions, they can be re72See Clineburg, supra note 7, at 752; Givens, supra note 9, at 62.
73See notes 14- 19 and accompanying text supra.
74Clineburg, supra note 7, at 752.
71See Givens, supra note 9, at 62; Zinn, supra note 2 1, at 240.
71 See notes 20-2 1 and accompanying text supra.
77See note 22 and accompanying text supra.
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constructed at present only by speculation. In the absence of any
clear intent to convey a more limited meaning by the use of the
word "bill," the issue of its original content must remain open.
Thus it appears that the attempt to find the meaning of Article
1, Section 7 through the traditional techniques and sources of constitutional construction is inconclusive. The argument in favor of
a restricted definition of the word "bill" has a great deal of
intuitive appeal, for it is possibly the only logical midpoint between allowing Congress to restrict the veto power at will merely
by collecting various measures under a single heading and permitting the President the full power to pick and choose as he
wishes among the provisions of a legislative proposal. The argument is not totally convincing, however, and a case can be made
in favor of a procedural definition of the term. It therefore seems
appropriate to move beyond the constitutional language itself and
view the problem as one involving the constitutional separation of
powers.

III.

SEPARATION OF POWERS.

The separation of powers and related concepts have a rich
background in political theory and practice, much of which is
directly relevant to the creation of our constitutional system. 7
Although the doctrine is not explicitly stated in the Federal Constitution, 79 it was of fundamental importance to the framers and
78

W. GWYN, THE MEANING OF THE SEPARATION OF POWERS (1965); P.
MONTESQUIEU
IN AMERICA,
1760-1801 (1940); M. VILE, CON-

See generally

SPURLIN,

(1967); Brand, Montesquieu and the
Separation of Powers, 12 OREGON L. REV. 175 (1933); Farlie, The Separation of Powers,
21 MICH. L. REV. 393 (1923); Parker, Separation of Powers Revisited, 49 MICH. L. REV.
1009, 1011-20 (195 1); Sharp, The Classical American Doctrine of "'The Separation of
Powers," 2 U. CHI. L. REV. 385 (1935); Wright, The Origins of the Separation of Powers
in America, 13 EcONOMICA 169 (1933), reprinted in SUBCOMM. ON SEPARATION OF
STITUTIONALISM AND THE SEPARATION OF POWERS

POWERS OF THE COMMITTEE ON THE JUDICIARY, SEPARATION OF POWERS AND
INDEPENDENT AGENCIES: CASES AND SELECTED READINGS, S. DOC. No. 91-49,

THE

91st
Cong., Ist Sess. 240 (1969) (prepared by the Legislative Reference Service of the Library
of Congress).
79 Several states urged the explicit inclusion of the separation doctrine in the Bill of
Rights, but Congress rejected the recommendations. I ANNALS OF CONG. 760-61 (1834);
1 S. JOUR. 64, 73-74 (1820). Most state constitutions contain provisions expressly recognizing the separation of powers. AMERICAN BAR FOUNDATION PROJECT ON THE
UNAUTHORIZED PRACTICE OF LAW, UNAUTHORIZED PRACTICE STATUTE BOOK 2-3
(1961). The language of the Michigan constitution is typical:
The powers of government are divided into three branches; legislative, executive and judicial. No person exercising powers of one branch shall exercise
powers properly belonging to another branch except as expressly provided in
this Constitution.
MICH. CONST. art. I11. § 2.
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permeated their work.8 0 It has been uniformly acknowledged 8 l
that the principle is implicit in the structure of the first three
articles of the Constitution, in which the legislative, executive,
and judicial powers are assigned to the three branches of government.8 2 As a constitutional principle, it serves to "limit and control" the interpretation of that document.8 3 The tension between
riders and the veto power quite obviously is a problem affecting

the distribution of legislative capabilities within the federal government. Given the uncertainty of its resolution through the application of other interpretative devices, 8 4 it becomes important to
consider the bearing of the separation of powers doctrine upon
this area of potential conflict.
There is far less agreement upon just what the separation of
powers doctrine represents in theory or requires in practice than
upon its existence as an organizing principle. In the United States
it constitutes a fusion of two concepts. The first is what might be
called the pure, or strict, separation of powers. This concept
contemplates a relatively rigid partitioning of both the functions

and the departments of government into, at least in its modern
form, three divisions: legislative, executive, and judicial.8a The
80 "No concept of government was so unanimously accepted by all the statesmen whose
genius brought into being the American nation as was the doctrine of the separation of
governmental powers." A. VANDERBILT, THE DOCTRINE OF THE SEPARATION OF POWERS
AND ITS PRESENT-DAY SIGNIFICANCE 4 (1953).
It is not surprising, therefore, that the principle of the separation of powers
was accepted without any debate whatever by the members of the convention. It had become an axiom; and the only question was of applying it.

All the plans presented to the convention provided, in some form, for the
separation of powers.
Sharp, supra note 78, at 419-20 (footnote omitted). For a discussion of the constitutional
convention's struggle to apply this axiom to specific problems, see id. at 419-25.
85
See, e.g., Springer v. Philippine Islands, 277 U.S. 189, 201 (1928); Kilbourn v.
Thompson, 103 U.S. 168, 190-91 (1881); 2 J. STORY, COMMENTARIES ON THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES §518, at 2 (lst ed. 1833); A. MASON & W. BEANEY,
AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 59-60 (5th ed. 1972).
82 "All legislative Powers herein granted shall be vested in a Congress of the United
States... " U.S. CONST. art. I, § I. "The executive Power shall be vested in a President
of the United States of America." U.S. CONST. art. 11, § 1. "The judicial Power of the
United States shall be vested in one supreme Court, and in such inferior Courts as the
Congress may from time to time ordain and establish." U.S. CONST. art. Ill, § I.
83National Mut. Ins. Co. v. Tidewater Transfer Co., 337 U.S. 582, 590-9 1 (1949).
Justice Jackson wrote:
The doctrine of separation of powers is fundamental in our system. It arises,
however, not from Art. 3 nor any other single provision of the Constitution,
but because "behind the words of the constitutional provisions are postulates
which limit and control." Chief Justice Hughes in Monaco v. Mississippi,
292 U.S. 313, 323.
84
See part I I supra.
85See M. VILE, supra note 78, at 13.
There is of course no talismanic quality about the familiar tripartite division, which did
not become the dominant mode of analysis until the mid-I1700s. Prior to that time it was
common to distinguish only the executive and legislative functions, subsuming the judicial
function under the former heading. See generally W. GWYN, supra note 78 (focusing
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nature of any particular power should, under this view, determine
which agency is to be assigned, as nearly as possible, the exclusive right to exercise that power. Thus, in its ideal form,
specialization and compartmentalization of governmental activities would be complete.8 6
This position is modified by the second concept inherent in the
separation doctrine, the inclusion within our constitutional structure of provisions for checks and balances, powers given to each
branch to control directly the activities of the others through a
87
limited exercise of the other branches' distinctive functions.
Whereas the theory of strict separation is intended to operate as a
negative check on the accumulation and exercise of concentrated
power, the theory of checks and balances supplements the strict
88
doctrine with more positive means of control.
As it represents an amalgam of two opposed ideas-the segregation and the sharing of powers-there is a certain tension inherent in the doctrine. Furthermore, there are serious practical
difficulties raised by the ambiguity of the tripartite categorization
of functions; even if analytically sound, this categorization implies
a far more clear-cut distinction than is evident in reality.89 These
observations suggest two corollaries. First, the separation of powers doctrine may be interpreted in a way which emphasizes either
the segregation of power, or its sharing through checks and balances. Second, however conceived, its actual applications and
primarily on the period from 1650 to 1750). Many of the doctrine's more modern critics
have attacked the conventional distinctions as being arbitrary, unscientific, and a distortion
of reality. See, e.g., the review of such literature contained in Fairlie, supra note 78, at
418-31; J. LANDIS, THE ADMINISTRATIVE PROCESS 47 (1938):
The desirability of four, five, or six 'branches' of government would seem to
be a problem determinable not in the light of numerology but rather against a
background of what we now expect government to do.
The most recent efforts in the area reflect the growth of a social scientific approach and
more sophisticated concepts of power and function. See, e.g., H. LASSWELL & A. KAPLAN, POWER AND SOCIETY 192-99 (1950); Almond, A Functional Approach
parative Politics, in THE POLITICS OF THE DEVELOPING AREAS (G. Almond & J.

to ComColeman

eds. 1960).
8See
M. VILE, supra note 78, at 13; W. GWYN, supra note 78, at 8-9.
87 In Myers v. United States, 272 U.S. 52, at 291 (1926) Justice Brandeis wrote in
dissent:
The separation of powers of government did not make each branch completely autonomous. It left each, in some measure, dependent upon the
others, as it left to each power to exercise, in some respects, functions in
their nature executive, legislative and judicial-.
88 M. VILE, supra note 78, at 18.
89 Springer v. Phillipine Islands, 227 U.S. 189, 209 (1928). Justice Holmes dissented,
stating:
It does not seem to need argument to show that however we may disguise it
by veiling words we do not and cannot carry out the distinction between
legislative and executive action with mathematical precision and divide the
branches into watertight compartments, were it ever so desirable to do so,
which I am far from believing that it is, or that the Constitution requires.
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manifestations will be far less rigorous than its abstract statements. The doctrine's history seems to confirm both hypotheses.
The tension between the theory of strict separation and the idea
of checks and balances has been a source of debate throughout
the nation's history. Among the framers, men such as James
Wilson and James Madison disagreed upon which principle was
more important, 90 but virtually all favored the blending of powers
to some extent.9 1 After the advent of partisan politics Jeffersonian
Republicans urged a strict separation of powers, 9 2 while at the
opposite extreme, placing nearly all emphasis on checks and balances, was the Federalist John Adams 3 Not only the Constitution but the great majority of contemporary political figures
94
fell somewhere between these extremes.
In developing the constitutional doctrine, the courts have
tended to emphasize, at least in their general formulations, the
idea of strict separation. 95 Nevertheless, the difficulties of implementing the strict version have produced a reluctance to enforce
it. Chief Justice Marshall's statement that "the difference between
the departments undoubtedly is, that the legislative makes, the
executive executes, and the judiciary construes the law . . ." is
immediately followed by the qualification that "the maker of the
90 Madison and Wilson were perhaps the two most influential proponents of the new
Constitution, and both were concerned with justifying the extent to which it departed from
a strict separation of powers. Madison emphasized the need for flexibility in making the
most effective and judicious use of that principle, arguing that the blending of powers
proposed under the Constitution was essential to insure that each department could defend
itself against encroachment by the others. THE FEDERALIST Nos. 47 & 48, at 373-87 (J.
Hamilton ed. 1864) (J. Madison). Wilson, although admitting the necessity of checks and
balances, thought that these ought to be minimized, and he relied most heavily on the idea
of separation itself. J. WILSON, COMMENTARIES ON THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED
STATES 5 1-52 (1792).

91
See M. VILE, supra note 78, at 156-57, 160. See generally Sharp, supra note 78.
92
See, e.g., J. TAYLOR, AN INQUIRY INTO THE PRINCIPLES AND POLICY OF

THE

GOVERNMENT OF THE UNITED STATES (1814).
93

See J.

ADAMS,

A

DEFENCE

OF THE

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA (1787, 1788).

CONSTITUTIONS

OF GOVERNMENT

OF THE

94 An especially good discussion may be found in M. VILE, supra note 78, at 119-75.
95E.g., Springer v. Phillipine Islands, 277 U.S. 189, 201-02 (1928). The Court stated:
It may be stated then, as a general rule inherent in the American constitutional system, that unless otherwise expressly provided or incidental to
the powers conferred, the legislature cannot exercise either executive or
judicial power; the executive cannot exercise either legislative or judicial
power; the judiciary cannot exercise either executive or legislative power.
The existence in the various constitutions of occasional provisions expressly
giving to one of the departments powers which by their nature otherwise
would fall within" the general scope of the authority of another department
emphasizes, rather than casts doubt upon, the generally inviolate character of
this basic rule.
See also, Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 588-89 (1952);
Humphrey's Executor v. United States, 295 U.S. 602, 629-30 (1935); O'Donoghue v.
United States, 289 U.S. 516, 530 (1933); Union Pacific Ry. v. United States (Sinking
Fund Cases), 99 U.S. 700, 718 (1879).
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law may commit something to the discretion of the other departments, and the precise boundary of this power is a subject of
delicate and difficult inquiry, into which a court will not enter
unnecessarily. ' 9 6 This realism, coupled with the unavoidable recognition that certain checks and balances are also part of the
constitutional mandate, has led the judiciary to adopt more "prac97
tical and workable" delineations of power.
For example, at issue in J.W. Hampton Jr. & Co. v. United
States9" was the constitutionality of legislation imposing a duty on
the President to analyze differences of production costs in the
United States and other countries and make appropriate adjustments in tariff rates. The act was challenged as an unconstitutional delegation of legislative power. 99 Although Chief Justice Taft stated that granting legislative power to the President
would constitute a "breach of fundamental national law," the
delegation was nevertheless upheld on the ground that the power
to set tariff rates was not purely legislative, but was merely a
power to determine how the tariff laws were to be executed. 10 0
Similarly, in Field v. Clark'0 the Court considered a law which
authorized the President to suspend the operation of an act allowing the free introduction of certain raw materials into this country
if he should find that another country is imposing unreasonable
tariffs on American goods. Stating that the prohibition of congressional delegation of its power to the executive is "a principle
universally recognized as vital to the integrity and maintenance of
the system of government ordained by the Constitution,- 1 0 2 the
Court upheld the act on the ground that the power is a proper one
for executive discretion. Moreover, in Kilbourn v. Thompson the
Court issued one of its strongest statements supporting the theory
of strict separation.' 0 3 Yet the Court recognized that Congress
96

Wayman v. Southard, 23 U.S. (10 Wheat.) 1, 46 (1825).

97 Fisher, Funds Impounded by the President: The Constitutional Issue, 38 GEO.
WASH. L. REV. 124, 132 (1969).
98276 U.S. 394 (1928).

99 One of the corollaries to the separation doctrine in this country has been the principle
that "none of the departments may abdicate its powers to either of the others." E.
CORWIN, THE PRESIDENT: OFFICE AND POWERS 1787- 1957 at 9 (4th ed. 1957). Although
the delegation doctrine is presently thought to be of little independent significance, it has in
the past been a fruitful source of litigation involving the separation of powers. Id.
500 276 U.S. at 406.
101 143 U.S. 649 (1892).
102 id. at 692.
103 103 U.S. 168, 190-91. The court observed:

It is believed to be one of the chief merits of the American system of written
constitutional

law, that all the powers entrusted to government, whether

State or national, are divided into the three grand departments, the executive, the legislative, and the judicial. That the functions appropriate to each of
these branches of government shall be vested in a separate body of public
servants, and that the perfection of the system requires that the lines which
separate and divide these departments shall be broadly and clearly defined.
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has the normally judicial power to punish both members and
10 4
nonmembers for contempt in connection with its proceedings.
In sum, "[t]he doctrine of the separation of powers has not
been, nor was it intended to be, strictly enforced."' 10 5 Despite its
occasionally doctrinaire formulations, separation cannot be mechanically or absolutely imposed. It is not satisfactory merely to
say that the power to veto a bill is given to the executive, and
therefore the limitations placed on that power by the use of riders
are in violation of the separation doctrine. It is equally unsatisfactory to say that the power to legislate is clearly vested in
Congress and that any limitations on that power, such as the
presidential veto, should be strictly construed. The doctrine does
not provide easy answers to disputes between the President and
Congress. Instead, it creates "a complex and dynamic pattern of
power sharing between the branches with no simple or precise
guidelines available which allow consistent ... condemnation of
106
specific actions, except in extreme cases."
The objective of separation of powers and checks and balances
is to limit the concentration of power within the branches of
government. 10 7 The doctrine seeks to attain this goal by assuring
that no one branch will possess so much authority as to render
another branch relatively powerless.' 0 8 Because the pattern of
relationships whereby authority is allocated between them is fluid
and highly circumstantial, application of the doctrine must be
similarly flexible, depending in each instance upon what sort of
separation or blending of powers will best maintain a proper
balance of capabilities between the respective branches.' °
Arguably, this determination cannot be made on the basis of
the simple application of prior case law; instead, it should rely on
an analysis of the relationship between the branches and the most
appropriate resolution in light of that relationship. The "living"
104

Id. at 197.

A. MASON & W. BEANEY,supra note 8 1, at 6 1.
106 Cooper & Cooper, The Legislative Veto and the Constitution, 30 GEO. WASH. L.

105

REV.
467, 502-03 (1962).
0 7
1
See Lichter v. United States, 334 U.S. 742 (1948); Chicago & So. Air Lines v.
Waterman Steamship Co., 333 U.S. 103 (1948); Perkins v. Lukens Steel Co., 310 U.S.
113 (1940); Brown v. Walker, 161 U.S. 591 (1896). See also D. BROWN, THE GROWTH
OF DEMOCRATIC GOVERNMENT 84 (1959); Caffey, Federal Executive Power, 95 CENTRAL
L.J. 3, 15 (1922).
108
THE FEDERALISTNo. 47, at 375 (J. Hamilton ed. 1864). James Madison concluded:
[Montesquieul did not mean that [the] departments ought to have no partial
agency in, or no control over the acts of each other. His meaning, as his own
words import.., can amount to no more than this, that where the whole
power of one department is exercised by the same hands which possess the
whole power of another department, the fundamental principles of a free

constitution are subverted.
'09See A. VANDERBILT, supra note 80, at 49-5 I.
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nature of the Constitution, which makes it adaptable to all contingencies in a constantly changing social order, 110 suggests reliance
in constitutional decisions of this type on an examination of that
social order and its interrelationships."' Prior cases should play a
12
secondary role in such analysis."
The actual context of a dispute may even reveal that a particular power should be granted to one branch of government, although it is a power traditionally classified as belonging to another. For example, the Constitution states that Congress has
authority over public property. 113 In 1915, however, the Supreme
Court upheld the President's argument that he had the power to
withdraw public land from private acquisition." 4 Similarly, the
President has greatly expanded his authority over the conduct of
foreign affairs in recent years. Such increased power is, in part,
considered necessary because of the critical decisions in this area
which must be made quickly." 5 It is unlikely, in the absence of
extreme abuses, that a court would declare this power an uncon116
stitutional encroachment on legislative authority.
Thus, the application of the separation of powers doctrine to
the conflict between the enactment of nongermane riders and the
110 Miller, Notes on the Concept of the "Living" Constitution, 31 GEO. WASH. L. REV.
881, 884 (1963).
"' Cf. Wolf v. Colorado, 338 U.S. 25, 27 (1949). Justice Frankfurter noted that:
[t]o rely on a tidy formula for the easy determination of what is a fundamental right for purposes of legal enforcement may satisfy a longing for certainty
but ignores the movements of a free society .... The real clue to the problem
confronting the judiciary in the application of the Due Process Clause is not
to ask where the line is once and for all to be drawn but to recognize that it is
for the Court to draw it by the gradual and empiric process of "inclusion and
exclusion."
This approach was also reflected in an early essay of Mr. Justice Holmes:
[T]he moment you leave the path of merely logical deduction you lose the
illusion of certainty which makes legal reasoning seem like mathematics. But
the certainty is only an illusion, nevertheless. Views of policy are taught by
experience of the interests of life. Those interests are fields of battle.
Holmes, Privilege, Malice, and Intent, 8 HARV. L. REV. 1,7 (1894). Court decisions in
which the dispute is considered in the context of the current social order are sometimes
condemned as "judicial fiat." See, e.g., Neal, Baker v. Carr: Politics in Search of Law,
1962 SuP. CT. REV. 252. Such decisions, however, are not at all unusual in the history of
the Supreme Court. See generally Miller, supra note 110.
112 The Supreme Court has said that the doctrine of stare decisis is not to be applied as
rigidly in constitutional cases as in others. E.g., Glidden Co. v. Zdanok, 370 U.S. 530, 543
(1962). Similarly, the "intent of the framers" may play a clearly subordinate role in
constitutional decision-making to the extent that such intent is not clearly contained in the
Constitution. The framers obviously could not anticipate all the complexities of American
society in the twentieth century, nor did they try to do so. Their views as to the specific
institutions of the government and the relationships between those institutions should be
far less important than the general principles of the Constitution. See Missouri v. Holland,
252 U.S. 416, 433 (1920).
113 U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 3.
114 United States v. Midwest Oil Co., 236 U.S. 459 (1915).
115See note 147 and accompanying text infra.
11 6
See Orlando v. Laird, 443 F.2d 1039 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 869 (1971).
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veto power must primarily involve an examination of the interaction between the legislative and executive branches in regard
to their relative strengths, especially the influence they can bring
to bear on legislation. 117 The question is whether the institution of
the power to veto nongermane riders, in light of the present-day
interaction between the branches, would create an imbalance in
the proper allocation of powers between them, or whether it
would restore a balance which has been lost as a result of the
increased use of riders. Of course, once that question is answered,
it will not be subject to reexamination with every shift in the
relative powers of the President and Congress. In analyzing the
issue for the first time, however, a court must, to the extent that
the separation of powers doctrine is involved, consider the balance of power among the branches."18
IV.

THE CURRENT BALANCE OF

LEGISLATIVE AND EXECUTIVE POWERS

"The Constitution limits [the President's] function in the lawmaking process to the recommending of laws he thinks wise and
the vetoing of laws he thinks bad."' 1 9 As a restatement of constitutional language, this dictum of Mr. Justice Black cannot be
criticized. American Presidents in the twentieth century, however, have developed an enormous degree of extraconstitutional
power to influence legislation. One observer has, in fact, concluded that "the President is now the central figure in the legisla1 20
tive process."
Some measure of the increased presidential power over legislation is derived from the congressional relinquishment of a significant role in legislative drafting. Each year many major bills are
written by the executive branch and are presented to Congress as
part of a comprehensive program. 12 ' Similarly, the federal budget
117 H. BLACK, THE RELATION OF THE EXECUTIVE POWER TO LEGISLATION 115 (1919).
In another conflict between the executive and legislative branches, Justice Jackson considered it "relevant to note the gap that exists between the President's paper powers and his
real powers." Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 653 (1952)
(Jackson, J., concurring).
118 The analysis of the separation of powers doctrine as primarily embracing a theory of
balance is of course appropriate for other areas of executive-legislative conflict. See note 3
supra.
119 Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 587 (1952).
20
1 D. CATER, POWER IN WASHINGTON 7 (1964).
121 "The President and his Cabinet have all too often tended to regard themselves as the
real legislative department, with the Congress expected to receive and act upon their
views ....Today, the drafting of legislation by the executive departments has become a
commonplace." 2 B. SCHWARTZ, A COMMENTARY ON THE CONSTITUTION OF THE
UNITED STATES: THE POWERS OF GOVERNMENT 29 (1963). See also, H. BLACK, supra
note 117, at 57, 183.
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is prepared by the executive branch for presentation to Congress. 12 2 It has even been argued that the executive and legislative
roles have, in fact, been reversed, for the President "initiates the
legislative process and it is the legislature that vetoes by refusing
123
to approve.
Perhaps even more important in this regard than the opportunity to draft legislation is the President's position as the principal
figure of a major national political party. Party loyalties play a
large role in gathering support for proposals before Congress, and
the President, more than any other individual, is in a position to
12 4
command those loyalties.
The President may also assert a more direct influence on members of Congress. 2 5 The patronage system plays a significant role
in the President's efforts to influence legislation, 26 and the veto
power itself may play a much larger part in the aggrandizement of
presidential power than is evident. The threat of a veto can have
disastrous effects on legislation, and, in light of the relative
difficulty of overriding a veto, such threats, veiled and otherwise,
1 27
may be responsible for the demise of many bills.
The President's position as the principal figure of the national
government and his consequent access to the mass media have
provided him with an unparalleled opportunity to affect public
opinion and, consequently, to bring to bear pressure upon legislators. 128 Furthermore, the presidential staff serves in part as an
administrative bureaucracy and in part as a public relations department, much of its effort being directed toward influencing
public opinion. The indirect effect on Congress which results from
the President's ability to affect public sentiment provides him with
"a leverage upon those who are supposed to check and balance
129
his power."
It is clear that the President today possesses enormous legislative influence. Almost fifty years ago, one scholar designated the
22

1 The overall program of a President is reflected in his budget. Its importance cannot
be overemphasized, for it reflects the President's "blueprint for public policy." W. KEEFE
& M. OGUL, supra note 17, at 400.
123 Breitel, The Lawmakers, 65 COLUM. L. REV. 749, 760 (1965).
124 E. CORWIN & L. KOENIG, THE PRESIDENCY TODAY 78-83 (1956); B. GROSS, supra
note 16, at 61, 102(1953).
125 H. BLACK, supra note 117, at 59-60, 183.
126 E. CORWIN & L. KOENIG, supra note 124, at 98; W. KEEFE & M. OGUL, supra note
17, at 408.
127 This possible function of the veto power was recognized by the framers. See, e.g.,
THE FEDERALIST No. 73, at 551 (J. Hamilton ed. 1864) (A. Hamilton).
28
1 E. CORNWELL, PRESIDENTIAL LEADERSHIP OF PUBLIC OPINION 208-53 (1965).
129 Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 653- 54 (1952) (Jackson,

J., concurring).
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President the "Chief Legislator," 1 3 0 and it is generally acknowledged that the power of the executive has increased significantly
since that time. 1 3 ' If the separation of powers doctrine is seen as a
fairly strict functional division of authority between the branches
of government, with only a limited blending of powers, then any
further increase in the presidential legislative power would be
unwarranted. That view requires that Congress maintain its dominance in the legislative arena; yet the recent aggrandizement of
presidential power has, to some degree, taken the legislative power out of the hands of Congress and placed it in the executive
branch. Any increase in presidential legislative power could work
to further this process of aggrandizement and might thereby contravene the separation of powers doctrine.
An examination of the various types of veto provisions in effect
in the states and their impact on legislative-executive relations
may help to illuminate the effect that separate vetoes for nongermane riders would be likely to have in the federal system. One
state, North Carolina, provides for no executive veto, 3 2 while
33
Washington allows its governor to veto any item of any bill.'

Most of the other states allow some form of an item veto, but this
power is typically limited to items of appropriations bills.' 3 4 Some
states allow the governor to reduce items of appropriations
bills.' 3 5 It is extremely difficult to determine the precise effect of

the item veto on legislative-executive relations, for many other
factors influence the extent of the governor's power to shape
legislation.' 3 6 Some legislatures may override a gubernatorial veto
by a simple majority vote, 13 7 while others must produce a
two-thirds majority.' 38 Some governors are allowed, under the
terms of the state's constitution, to return vetoed legislation to the
legislature with proposed amendments. 3 9 The time which a gov130 H. McBAIN, THE LIVING CONSTITUTION 117 (1927).
131 A. MASON & W. BEANEY, supra note 8 1, at 66-67.
132 Cf. N.C. CONST. art. III, § 5. See also Prescott, The Executive Veto in the American
States, 3 WEST. POL. Q. 98, 99 (1950).
'3 WASH. CONST. art. 111, § 12.
134 Beckman, The Item Veto Power of the Executive, 31 TEMPLE L.Q. 27 (1957). The

New York constitution is typical: "If any bill presented to the Governor contains several
items of appropriations of money, he may object to one or more of such items while
approving of the other portions of the bill." N.Y. CONST. art. IV, § 7. See also CAL.
CONST. art. IV, § 16.
135 E.g., MASS. CONST. art. 63, § 5.
136 Many of these other factors are intangible. For example, the personality of a particular governor or the strength of his powers of persuasion may have more influence on the
votes of state legislators than the threat of a veto. Cf. Comment, Executive Orders and the
Development of PresidentialPower, 17 VILL. L. REV. 688 (1972).
137 E.g., W. VA. CONST. art. Vii, § 14.
138 E.g., N.J. CONST. art V, § I.

139E.g., ALA. CONST. art. V, § 125.
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ernor has to veto legislation during a legislative session before a
140
bill actually becomes law also varies greatly.
Nevertheless, one generalization concerning the effect of the
item veto in the states is possible: it has contributed to the general
increase in gubernatorial control of legislative activities. It has
provided "the one additional power necessary to make the veto a
potential legislative 'stick' in the hands of any Governor inclined
so to use it." ' 141 There is no reason to doubt that a similar effect
would result from the institution of any form of an item veto in the
federal system, and that the institution of the power to veto
nongermane riders would further enhance the President's power
to influence legislation. The President would possess a much
larger bargaining chip with which to purchase compliance on the
part of Congress, and the use of riders to force presidential
acceptance of legislation would be eliminated. The President,
already in a position to shape legislation to fit his program, would
be able to resist effectively any intrusion into that program by
Congress.
Furthermore, a qualitative change in the influence of the executive branch on legislation would result from the institution of this
power. The power to veto individual sections of a piece of legislation is more than the mere power to reject, for it is the power to
alter legislation. A piece of legislation is a product of a complex
interaction between individual legislators, interest groups, the
public, and the President himself.142 The individual sections of
any bill, including the riders, are reflective of the inevitable compromise that occurs within Congress on any important matter.
Some provisions are, in effect, passed by Congress only on the
condition that other provisions, sometimes in the form of riders,
are included in the bill. To allow the President then to veto the
rider separately would be to confer a new and different type of
power on the executive.1 43 A majority of Congress may very well
oppose a bill in the form in which it is finally approved if the
President exercised such a power. Thus the will of one man could
conceivably cause the enactment of legislation opposed by a majority of Congress.
It is clear that although the President is afforded the power, and
even the obligation, to oversee legislative policy under the provi140 For example, West Virginia allows the governor only five days to return a bill (W.
VA. CONST. art. VII, § 14), while New York allows ten days (N.Y. CONST. art. IV, § 7)
and Missouri fifteen days (Mo. CONST.art. i11,
§§ 31, 33).
141 Negley, The Executive Veto in Illinois, 33 AM. POL. Sci. REV. 1049, 1052 (1939).
See generally Beckman, supra note 134.
142 Breitel, supra note 123, at 759-77.
143 Comment, supra note 50, at 127- 28.
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sions of Article 1, Section 7 of the Constitution, he is not given
the power to occupy the position of chief policy-maker for the
federal government. 144 In light of the extensive power currently
available to the President to affect legislation, and the longstanding general trend toward aggrandizement of authority in the
executive branch, the added power to veto nongermane amendments to bills would not only increase executive influence but
would establish the presidency as the primary locus of policy-making in the federal government. Such reallocation of authority would arguably be in derogation of the separation of powers
45
doctrine.
On the other hand, if the separation doctrine is seen not as a
device for isolating the legislative function within one branch of
the government but is viewed as primarily a balancing formula, in
which the dominant feature is the blending of powers, the concern
should be over the general balance of congressional and presidential power. A slight increase in the executive's legislative powers,
such as the power to veto nongermane riders, would be permissible so long as it did not result in an unacceptable concentration of power in one branch. 4 6 Focusing on the overall balance of
power between the two branches, however, leads to the same
conclusion as focusing on the separation aspects of the doctrine:
the power of the President is at an historic high, and any increase
in that power at the expense of Congress would violate the separation of powers doctrine.
There are several reasons underlying this increased power of
the executive branch. The need for decisive action in times of
national emergency has thrust the President to the forefront in
this era of daily crises.' 47 The uncertain dimensions of the term
"executive power"' 48 have, to some degree, created hesitation to
declare actions of the executive branch as outside its power. 149
Furthermore, the abdication of Congress from some of its traditional functions has created a void which the President has
filled.' 50 For example, through the Budget and Accounting Act of
144

H. BLACK, supra note 117, at 115.

14 See notes 85-86 and accompanying text supra.
146

See notes 87-94 and accompanying text supra.

147 E. CORWIN & L. KOENIG, supra note 124, at 29:

In the course of the last half century expansion of the presidential role has
been substantially continuous, thanks to a succession of strong Presidents, to
our involvement in two world wars, to "an economic crisis more serious than
war," to "a cold war" more baffling in some respects than "a shooting war,"
and to a succession of industrial strikes or threats of strikes.
148 U.S. CONST. art. 11, § 1.
149 E. CORWIN & L. KOENIGsupra note 124, at 2-3.

150 Id. at 56.

Journal of Law Reform

[VOL. 6:735

19211 51 the Congress transferred to the President the task of
formulating the national budget. 152 Whatever the causes, there is
little doubt that the President possesses enormous power in all
15 3
spheres of governmental activity.
Thus, if the separation of powers doctrine is seen primarily as a
constitutional balancing concept, under which there must be a
general balance between the aggregate of powers residing in each
of the three branches, it is clear that the branch which least needs
fortification through the grant of additional power is the executive.
The Presidency has increased its power substantially in this century,1 54 and any further increase, under this concept of the separation doctrine, would only further imbalance the scales in favor of
that branch.' 55 Thus the proposed increase in the presidential veto
power finds vindication in neither of the dominant concepts contained in the separation of powers doctrine.
15131 U.S.C. §§ 1, 2, II,13-24, 41-58 (1970).
15231 U.S.C. § 11
(1970). Similarly, the Employment Act of 1946, 15
U.S.C. §§ 1021-24 (1970), calls for the President to make periodic economic reports, and
specific legislative proposals are expected to be part of such reports.
153 The President under the Constitution has broad powers to appoint and remove public
officials. U.S. CONST. art. If, § 2, cl.2. The power of appointment is "untrammeled under
Article II of the Constitution." Washington v. Clark, 84 F. Supp. 964, 966 (D.D.C. 1949),
affd sub. nom. Washington v. McGrath, 182 F.2d 375 (D.C. Cir.), affd, 341 U.S. 923
(1950). This power extends to all federal executive employees, from clerks to Cabinet
members. Baldauf v. Nitze, 261 F. Supp. 167 (S.D. Cal. 1966). Incident to the power of
appointment (Keim v. United States, 177 U.S. 290 (1900)) is the broad power of removal.
Myers v. United States, 272 U.S. 52 (1926). But see Humphrey's Executor v. United
States, 295 U.S. 602 (1935).
In times of war the President's powers are extensive. in such times the Congress may
delegate to the executive, because of the national emergency, many powers which could
not otherwise be granted. McKinley v. United States, 249 U.S. 397 (1919). Not only does
the President have broad power as to the actual conduct of the war (Fleming v. Page, 50
U.S. (9 How.) 603 (1850)), but he has correspondingly expanded powers over domestic
affairs. Dakota Central Cent. Tel. Co. v. South Dakota, 250 U.S. 163 (1919). See also
Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214 (1944); Hirabayshi v. United States, 320 U.S.
81 (1943).
The power of the executive branch in the field of foreign affairs is exclusive. United
States v. Curtiss Wright Export Co., 299 U.S. 304, 319 (1936). His power to make treaties
is subject to the advice and consent of the Senate (U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl.2), but
executive agreements can be made with foreign powers without Senate approval. These
agreements prevail over any state constitution or law. United States v. Belmont, 301 U.S.
324 (1937).
Pursuant to the duty to "take Care that the Laws be faithfully executed" (U.S. CONST.
art. II, § 3), the President may use federal troops when he finds that they are required in
order to quell potentially dangerous domestic situations. His decision in this regard is
"conclusive." Sterling v. Constantin, 287 U.S. 378 (1932).
154 The increase in executive power, "in comparison with the other two great departments has been the outstanding American political phenomenon of the twentieth century."
A. VANDERBILT, supra note 80, at 53. See also E. CORWIN & L. KOENIG, supra note 124,
at 27: "Taken by and large, the history of the presidency is a history of aggrandizement."
155 In assessing the separation of powers issue in the Steel Seizure Case, Justice Jackson
felt it important to consider the general increase of presidential power in recent years.
Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 653-54 (1952) (Jackson, J.,
concurring).
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CONCLUSION

Although it is a much maligned device, the legislative rider does
serve some useful purposes, including acting as a check on the use
of the presidential veto power. The power to veto entire pieces of
legislation, along with numerous extraconstitutional mechanisms
enjoyed by the executive in his attempt to influence legislative
policy, provides the President with extensive legislative power.
Any further increase in that power should be viewed with skepticism, for if the separation of powers doctrine is to retain its significance, it must serve to protect the legislative branch in its traditionally dominant policy-setting role. This traditional pattern has
been subjected to increasing executive encroachment during recent decades. The institution of the broad power to veto riders
would violate the separation doctrine, however that doctrine is
viewed, for through it the President would be placed in a position
to supplant Congress to an even greater degree in the legislative
function, and the general power of the executive branch would be
increased at the expense of Congress. A presidential veto of
nongermane riders would thus appear to violate the constitutional
mandate contained in the separation of powers doctrine.
-Richard A. Riggs

